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The big data era has a high impact on forensic data analysis. Work is done in speeding up
the processing of large amounts of data and enriching this processing with new tech-
niques. Doing forensics calls for speciﬁc design considerations, since the processed data is
incredibly sensitive. In this paper we explore the impact of forensic drivers and major
design principles like security, privacy and transparency on the design and implementa-
tion of a centralized digital forensics service.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Many papers in the ﬁeld of digital forensics start with
the observation that the size of digital material increases,
that the complexity and diversity of the digital evidence
grows and that more advanced techniques are needed to be
able to keep up with the evolving digital society.1
Since December 2010, the Netherlands Forensic Insitute
has been using a service-based approach for processing and
investigating high volumes of seized digital material: Dig-
ital Forensics as a Service (DFaaS) (van Baar et al., 2014).
This service is called XIRAF (Bhoedjang et al., 2012).
Now, four years later, this approach has become a
standard for hundreds of criminal cases and over a thou-
sand investigators, both in The Netherlands and abroad.
After having processed over a petabyte of data, we have
experienced the impact of the XIRAF system and the para-
digm shift it is causing (van Baar et al., 2014). XIRAF started in
2006 as a scientiﬁc research project aimed at identifying.M.A. van Beek).
echnology-trends-
ed March 11, 2015.and developing techniques for automating (parts of) the
data analysis process. XIRAF was never meant to be an
operational system for processing petabytes of data and
providing access to over a thousand investigators. As a
result, design decisions taken during the development of
XIRAF leave room for improvement.
In the beginning of 2012, we started working on the
successor of XIRAF, named HANSKEN. This work consisted of
deﬁning design principles, building a proof of concept (PoC)
based on the new principles and ideas, making design de-
cisions based on the principles and PoC and building a
production version to replace XIRAF. This paper provides an
overview of the major design decisions that form the
foundation for the HANSKEN solution for providing digital
forensics as a service.
A lot of challenges arise when building a system to
provide insight in petabytes of different types of data.
Especially when integrity and conﬁdentiality of the data are
crucial. While it is tempting to focus on developing new
techniques and building bigger and faster systems,
boundaries need to be established in which such a system
can operate. Without these boundaries, major risks of data
breaches and leaks of sensitive information exist.
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is desirable are described (forensic drivers), as well as the
motivation for the boundaries of such a system (design
principles). Section 3 contains considerations for how the
forensic drivers and design principles affect the chosen
solutions. Section 4 describes different solutions we have
implemented in HANSKEN in order to cope with the consid-
erations while still being able to do digital forensics. A lot of
work has been done in the ﬁeld of forensics and big data,
even though the term was not yet used in most related
work. Section 5 discusses different topics related to big data
and how we see them match with a forensic big data
platform like HANSKEN. Finally, we draw conclusions in Sec-
tion 6.
Motivation
Business needs provide the main reasons for developing
and providing a centralized system for doing large scale
forensic data analysis. First of all, cost reduction asks for
automating parts of the extraction and analysis process.
Here, the economies of scale apply (Armbrust et al., 2010).
Secondly, centralization makes it possible to standardize
forensic data extraction and analysis and increase its
quality. All this is explained in detail below.
As mentioned, the Netherlands Forensic Insitute has
been providing Digital Forensics as a Service to the Dutch
law enforcement organizations since December 2010. Fig. 1
shows the procedure of handling digital forensic cases
using this approach.
On the right, there are detectives and analysts that have
questions related to information presumably available in
the digital material shown on the left. To guarantee forensic
integrity, forensic images are needed (van Baar et al., 2014;
Kohn et al., 2013), so the ﬁrst task is to create these forensic
copies of the digital devices. The images are copied to a
central storage and processed using a standard set of tools.
We call this the extraction process. The applied tools range
from tools that analyze ﬁle systems, extract ﬁles, carve
unallocated space and create full text indexes, to tools that
parse chat logs, browser history and e-mail databases. The
results of these tools, i.e. the extractedmetadata, are stored
in a centralized database. The combined data and metadata
of this process are referred to as traces, e.g. an e-mail, chat
message or zip archive. After storing these traces, they can
be queried using multiple methods: detectives can log on
using a web browser and query the traces by applying ﬁl-
ters and text searches. Digital investigators can use the
programming interface to run automated tools and scripts
written in their favorite programming language. Analysts
may want to retrieve all information and analyze the re-
sults using data visualization tools, integrate additional
data sources or build a network of contacts, for example.
This makes it possible to identify, classify, organize and
compare the traces within seconds, based on hypotheses
and questions the investigators have. This can be done at
any time during the investigation.
To support this process, the next paragraphs discuss the
three drivers, eight design principles and our two ways of
looking at data in the system. This deﬁnes the scope within
which we designed HANSKEN.Forensic drivers
Our main goal is to provide a service that processes high
volumes of digital material in a forensic context and gives
easy and secure access to the processed results. We identify
three main forensic drivers: minimization of the case lead
time, maximization of the trace coverage and specialization
of people involved. These forensic drivers are the reasons
for building a big data forensic platform.
Minimize case lead time
Generally, the ﬁrst 48 hours of an investigation are
critical to an investigation (U.S. Department of Justice,
Ofﬁce of Justice Programs, Ofﬁce of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, May 1998; Joyce, 2012;
Wikipedia). Traditionally, results from digital in-
vestigations are not available in these ﬁrst days. Traces
found in digital material are therefore often used for vali-
dating hypotheses instead of forming them. In an ever
increasing digital society, digital evidence becomes more
and more key evidence. This makes it unacceptable to
exclude digital material from the initial response: digital
material must be available to the investigation team in
those 48 hours. In this context, available does not only
mean that investigators have access to the data, but also
that they have tooling at their disposal for ﬁnding relevant
traces. Examples are high performance ﬁltering tools based
on trace details or keywords and visualization tools for
presenting search results.
To give access to the traces within 48 hours, processing
of the seized material must be automated. This has high
impact on the way digital material should be handled (van
Baar et al., 2014). Furthermore, the results of this auto-
mated process must be made available to the investigation
team directly and not to specialized digital investigators.
This is discussed below. Since investigation teams can be
scattered over multiple locations, access to the data and
extracted traces should not be limited by e.g. building or
department boundaries.
To speed up the investigation, detectives should be able
to annotate or tag interesting traces or traces they do not
understand. Other detectives and digital investigators must
have access to the annotation so that they can act on it.
Maximize coverage
Seized material varies wildly, both in types of devices
(hard drive, volatile memory or mobile phones), but also in
ﬁle systems and ﬁle formats contained in forensic copies
made from these devices. This is caused by simple things
like software upgrades and the availability of new devices
and new software for existing devices. This variation re-
quires constant attention to make sure that the traces
contained in the data are extracted. To keep up with soft-
ware upgrades as well as counteract the ever increasing
sophistication in technology used by suspects, increasing
sophistication in the trace extraction tools is needed.
Processing petabytes of data in a central environment
means processing a large variety of images. This requires
the tools to process many different ﬁle formats, database
formats and applications. Centralized processing of more
and more data results in increased insight in the coverage
Fig. 1. : Digital forensics as a service.
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it possible to constantly observe and increase the quality of
the extraction process.
Freeing up digital investigators to perform more in-
depth research will fortify this upward spiral, maximizing
the coverage. When more investigative methods are
developed, turnaround time and time spent for digital in-
vestigations will reduce. By embedding newly gathered
knowledge in the service, the system is used as a knowl-
edge center. New knowledge gained by research directly
helps other investigative teams that encounter the same
problems.
Finally, in the dynamic environment where new devices
and software is released daily, setting up an environment
that supports continuous delivery (Humble and Farley, 2010)
is needed to keep the service up to date.
Specialize people
Case detectives should be the ones looking at the digital
material. They can use their valuable case knowledge for
identifying relevant traces. Therefore, they must be pro-
vided with tools to query the traces, ﬁltering out irrelevant
ones, preferably within seconds. When relevant traces are
found, they must have direct access to the source material,
like pictures, document and e-mails.
It is true that detectives run into problems under-
standing certain concepts, like carved ﬁles or the inter-
pretation of a time stamp, but they can be educated. As
described by Bhoedjang et al. (Bhoedjang et al., 2012), the
beneﬁts of non-experts investigating digital material
outweigh the risks of misinterpretation.
Digital investigators help detectives by explaining the
query results and do more in-depth investigation on
technical details of relevant traces. This collaboration be-
tween detectives and digital investigators is crucial in un-
derstanding digital evidence. Traditional procedures make
it hard to collaborate. Digital investigators report large
result sets that are scattered across multiple detectives. Just
like with a printed dossier, splitting up the evidence makes
it harder to keep a bird's-eye view. In general, not material
but investigative topics are distributed among detectives.
The service model makes it possible to analyze all data inthe context of a topic. A trace that is irrelevant to one topic,
might be decisive to another topic in the same case.
To best support detectives during the investigation,
digital investigators should not be tasked with system
administrative tasks that are better performed by dedi-
cated system administrators. In most situations, digital in-
vestigators are held responsible for all aspects of their
investigation environment (storage, network, software,
security, etc.). Combined with their central role in securing
and analyzing digital evidence, this leads to a lot of
administrative overhead, possible security breaches, failing
backup systems and the use of obsolete software, amongst
others. Digital investigators are found to be either under-
qualiﬁed or overqualiﬁed for a lot of the tasks they perform
on a daily basis. In the DFaaS setup in The Netherlands,
digital investigators focus on the forensic tasks, i.e. seizing
material, extracting data from it and do in-depth research
on selected traces. The data is sent to a centralized system
that automatically extracts traces from the data and gives
digital investigators, detectives and analysts access to the
traces. Several administrators execute domain-speciﬁc
tasks related to this service, like application administra-
tion, database administration, storage administration and
infrastructure administration.
Design principles
Although the XIRAF systemwas never meant to be put in
production in its current scale, providing digital forensics as
a service using XIRAF has taught us a lot. The changing roles
of digital investigators, detectives and analysts are set out
above. One of the most important lessons learned is that
even though it is tempting to constantly add new and shiny
features and functionality, the foundations of the system
need to be thoroughly thought out. This reduces the risks
that comewith putting this much sensitive data in a central
location, sharing the infrastructure with different de-
partments or even organizations. Investing in a large
centralized system helps us to realize the forensic drivers,
but to make such a big investment viable, it requires a large
scale deployment.
Providing access to seized material via a centralized
service makes the investigation team depend on a remote
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investigation the digital investigators administered their
own hard- and software, they do not rely on system ad-
ministrators that may not be part of their own organization
and on hardware that is shared with other departments.
The risks of a big data platform and other considerations
have led us to deﬁne eight principles that we held to while
designing and implementing HANSKEN. In order of priority
they are:
1. Security
2. Privacy
3. Transparency
4. Multi tenancy
5. Future proof
6. Data retention
7. Reliability
8. High availability
With priority we mean that if a solution implemented
for principle 6 (data retention) clashes with a higher
principle, for example 3 (transparency), the solution is not
implemented and a different solution needs to be chosen.
The three most important principles are driven by socio-
logical needs, the other ones are mainly driven by business
needs. The principles apply to all aspects of the system: the
forensic data, the way this data is used in an investigation,
and the hardware, network and software design.Security, privacy and transparency: forensic data and forensic
professionals
The security principle encompasses all three corners of
the CIA triad (ISO, 2013): conﬁdentiality, integrity and
availability. In the forensic context, integrity and authen-
ticity (the fourth corner to the CIA “triad” that is always
added) (Tipton, 2009) are paramount, which is reﬂected in
security being our number one principle. The explicit
principles reliability and high availability were added since
they highly impact the design of a distributed
implementation.
In general, material is seized for a speciﬁc case with a
speciﬁc suspect and available exclusively to a limited team
of investigators for a limited amount of time. Seized ma-
terial contains a lot of personally identiﬁable information
(PII), like identities of suspects, victims, but probably also
their relatives. Although this data is available to the
investigation team, this does not mean that others should
have access to it. Furthermore, it may not be required for all
team members to have access to all details of all material.
The privacy of everyone involved with a crime must be
protected. The sociological principles dictate us that the
data should be made available to the investigators only
(data security), that the privacy of the identities in the
seized material has to be taken into account (data privacy)
and it must be possible to review how certain traces were
created and accessed (data transparency).
The three sociological principles apply to the digital
investigation process as well. Administrators, for
example, need insight in the load, i.e. the number ofconcurrent users, queries, et cetera, to keep the service
up and running. They do not need to know details on
who is accessing which case and what he or she is
querying for. So, only authorized people are allowed to
perform certain operations (professional security), the
privacy of the users of the service needs to be protected
(professional privacy), but it must be possible to trace
who did what with the seized material (professional
transparency).
Business principles
Next to the three sociological principles, we identify ﬁve
business principles that deﬁne the boundaries of the sys-
tem. They form the base for the requirements on the setup
and organization of the (technical) environment.
Multi tenancy
Since we want to service multiple users, probably even
multiple organizations (tenants), it is required that no in-
formation is disclosed between tenants. Moreover, the
impact of many users and complex queries should be
minimal on the other tenants.
Future proof
Development of HANSKEN started in 2012. After three
years of discussion, design and implementation, we have
built a systemwherewe feel conﬁdent we can keep upwith
growing data for the next years. New insights or techniques
may however warrant replacement of parts of the system.
This shouldn't result in a complete redesign of the system
or that parts of the system function differently due to a new
implementation.
Data retention
A lot of data will be processed by HANSKEN. If the service
is the only place where forensic data is stored, we need to
make sure this data is not lost due to system failure or user
errors. This is true for both the images created from seized
material, but also for logs generated by the use of the
system. The main driver for this principle is legal
obligation.
Reliability
When working with forensic data, the results should
be predictable: the investigator must be able to rely on
the extraction and analysis results. This means that
when we perform the extraction or query the data, the
output is deterministic and not dependent on factors
outside the forensic process, e.g. load on the cluster,
disks failing or a large number of concurrent users. Of
course, the data itself must be reliable too. This so-called
data integrity is covered in our security principle as
mentioned before.
High availability
As explained in the introduction, digital forensics is an
ever increasing ﬁeld and the amount of evidence found in
digital material continues to grow. This means that in-
vestigators continuously need access to the digital material,
preferably 24/7.
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In this section we motivate our most important design
considerations. While the three forensic drivers push to-
wards more functionality and unrestricted access of the
data, e.g. a developer looking at the case data to develop
new forensic methods, our eight principles push back to
reduce impact of a big data platform on security and pri-
vacy of suspects, victims and users of the system. Most
considerations are heavily related to a forensic big data
service solution, a violation has less impact for a single
machine solution with a single investigator analyzing a
small data set. The described considerations touch upon
different parts of the motivation and even though the
forensic drivers and design principles maywork in opposite
direction, we have found some solutions that help both
sides. Table 1 shows which consideration touches upon
which motivation.
With respect to security and privacy, we follow the ideas
of the Jericho Forum (Lacey, 2005). Their main strategy is to
be able to operate in a de-perimeterized environment
(Forum, Dec. 2006), meaning the protection of systems and
data on multiple levels by using a mixture of encryption,
inherently secure protocols, inherently secure computer
systems and data-level authentication rather than the
reliance of an organization on its (network) boundary/
perimeter to assumed hostile external systems and net-
works. With respect to security, the Jericho strategy states
that data should protect itself. In our context, it must also
prove itself to be forensically sound (data integrity). With
respect to privacy, the Jericho strategy is to have multiple
identities, derived from one core identity (Forum, May
2011). This implies security and privacy by design.
With respect to cryptography, we follow Kerkhoffs's
principle (Petitcolas et al., 2011), stating that the system
should be secure even if everything about the system,
except the key, is public knowledge.
The system is designed with a ‘trust no-one’ philosophy.
Although data is seized by detectives and handed over to
digital investigators for imaging, this does not mean that all
people involved in processing the data should have access
to it. For example, the developers and system administra-
tors (who are not part of the investigation team in the
service model) have no business need to look inside the
data. This means that the data has to protect itself.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the con-
siderations, summed up in Table 1.
Reusability of forensic knowledge
The forensic knowledge about ﬁle system formats, ﬁle
formats and other forensic knowledge obtained through
speciﬁcations, reverse engineering and publications should
not be stored in HANSKEN. We externalize this knowledge to
libraries that offer a standardized way (API) to export this
knowledge. Furthermore, we deﬁne a data model at a level
similar to this API, to store data and traces in XIRAF and
HANSKEN. The data model and libraries are already used in
XIRAF, so they are battle-tested with over a petabyte of data.
The advantage of using libraries is that they can be used
in other tools and have their own maintenance cycle. Since
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minimum, the system can be built and maintained by de-
velopers without a forensic background. Maintaining the
libraries is the responsibility of forensic investigators. If
they add new forensic knowledge, e.g. a new e-mail format
or a new property of an existing ﬁle system, this is auto-
matically incorporated into the extraction process.
Distributed extraction
Bringing the tools to the data
XIRAF makes it possible to apply tools to a forensic image
on a single machine. As a result, this extraction process does
not scale. Furthermore, this scheduling process is iterative,
where in each iteration, all tools check if there is data that
they can process. If so, the tool processes the data, resulting
in new traces or more details on the existing trace. For
example, initially, the volume tool extracts volumes from a
disk, the next iteration the ﬁle system tool identiﬁes ﬁle
systems and extracts ﬁles from them. Once ﬁles are avail-
able, lots of tools can be applied to them, like the hashing
tool, mime typing tool, e-mail tool and chat tool. All these
tools are applied subsequently. This implies that the data
needs to be extracted from the image multiple times: we
bring the data to each tool. Results are stored in an inter-
mediate ﬁle, until the extraction is complete. After having
processed all traces, the results of the extraction process are
published to a database to make traces available for
querying. This publication step is a manual process within
XIRAF.
To make it possible to process one forensic image using
multiple machines, we use distributed technology in
HANSKEN. Apart from that, we apply either all tools to a trace,
or no tool at all. The size of tools is generally relatively small
compared to the size of data that they need to process. Thus
instead of bringing the data to the processing tools, we
bring the tools to the data. This means that as soon as we
have the data available, we apply all tools to it. As soon as
the data is read from the image, it is kept in memory and all
tools are applied. Once a trace is fully processed, the results
are stored in a database so it can be queried while other
traces are still being extracted. This means that the ﬁrst
traces are queryable minutes after the analysis starts.
Data driven acquisition
Preferably, we start the process of extracting traces from
a forensic image as soon as the ﬁrst bits of a device are
uploaded to the central system. In order to extract traces
from an NTFS ﬁle system, for example, the master ﬁle table
(MFT) must be extracted ﬁrst. The MFT is generally not
stored at the beginning of the disk. When the extraction
process can request the blocks containing the MFT to be
served ﬁrst, it can start extracting the ﬁle meta data, thus
reducing the time to deliver these to the investigating team.
Furthermore, depending on the type of case (like ﬁnancial
fraud or child pornography) some ﬁle might be more
valuable than others. After examining the MFT, the blocks
for case-speciﬁc ﬁles can be requested subsequently.
Serving the blocks containing the MFT ﬁrst, makes it
possible to start analyzing it. Therefore, we designed an
image format (see below in Section 3.3) that splits theimage data in encrypted blocks. The image format supports
unordered blocks, that is the blocks in the image do not
necessarily need to follow the order of the original data.
This makes it possible to implement dynamic pipelining:
the extraction process inﬂuences the imaging process by
asking for certain blocks of data to become available with
priority, like the block containing the MFT. This may
lengthen the time it takes to image a disk due to the
random accesses, but the total processing time of the im-
aging plus extraction process is shortened.
We adopted this concept of data driven acquisition In
the design of HANSKEN. This does not necessarily mean that
the acquisition must be combined with the uploading of
the data to the central system. HANSKEN also supports the
conversion of an earlier acquired image to the new format.
Commonly used formats are supported, like raw and the
EnCase evidence image ﬁle format. The target location of
the newly created image can be a local ﬁle system, but also
the central system, resulting in a direct upload.
Image format
Wedesigned our own (forensic) image format. Themain
need for this format is that we want to compress and
encrypt the seized data, though we have to be able to
randomly access the data by multiple tools in parallel in a
distributed environment. Another need is described in the
previous section: Wewant to be able to read and store data
in a different order than starting at the ﬁrst byte and ending
at the last. To still be able to efﬁciently search and process
the data, we add an index ﬁle containing the location of
individual blocks. This index ﬁle also contains calculated
hashes for validating data integrity and authenticity. To
store details about the imaging process like information
about the acquisition, we add an optional third ﬁle. The
names of these three ﬁles correspond, though the latter
two get an additional extension.
To protect the data, it is compressed and encrypted as
soon as it is read from the seized material. The image
format supports multiple compression and encryption
mechanisms. Initially, the cryptographic key to decrypt the
data is only available to the investigator who set up the
imaging process. He is trusted with the physical device and
thus has access to the data. So security is taken into account
directly from the point that the data enters the system. To
make sure that the key and the image are kept apart, the
key must be stored in a different security domain from the
encrypted image.
It might be possible to use the Advanced Forensic
Framework 4 (AFF4) (Cohen et al., 2009) ﬁle format, though
our speciﬁc requirements on the combination of perfor-
mance, encryption, compression, random block order and
random access makes a new implementation preferable
and justiﬁable.
In-depth details on the design and implementation of
the image format are beyond the scope of this paper.
Key management
We use encryption for securing the data processed in
HANSKEN. As mentioned, the service itself only contains the
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service, in a separate security domain. We prefer a solution
where the images are stored in a centralized system and
the cryptographic keys are kept at the department
where the physical material resides. So, to access data in-
side the service, the requesting party has to provide infor-
mation needed for decrypting the data. This applies both to
users who want to delegate the extraction process to the
service as well as to users who want to query the extracted
traces.
Key storage
To be able to securely store the keys, we designed an
algorithm that makes sure the following conditions are
met:
 all data is encrypted using a key;
 all keys are stored in a remote key store;
 all data in the key store is encrypted based on a public/
private key pair;
 the cryptographic key to the data itself is not stored
directly;
 authorized users have access to a shared secret only
(which is not the key);
 only the service can reveal the key using this shared
secret;
 neither the key nor the shared secret has to be
communicated when accessing the service;
 only users who have been granted access to the shared
secret (initially the uploader of the image) can grant
others access to the data by sharing this secret.
A prerequisite for the algorithm is that the central ser-
vice as well as all users involved with the extraction and
analysis must have a public/private key pair. We deﬁne
functions for encrypting with either the private key (sign)
or public key of a user:
ðp; qÞu : public=private key pair for user u
EkðbÞ : encrypt b using key k
PUBuðbÞ ¼ EpðbÞ for key pair ðp; qÞu
SIGNuðbÞ ¼ PVTuðbÞ ¼ EqðbÞ for key pair ðp; qÞu
b ¼ PUBuðPVTuðbÞÞ ¼ PVTuðPUBuðbÞÞ
When storing data for image i in the central system, we
start by generating two keys: encryption key ki for
encrypting the data and shared secret si for obfuscating the
key. The shared secret is available to the user and must be
provided to access the data. The “key” can be calculated by
the HANSKEN service if and only if the shared secret is
provided.
ki : encryption key for image i
si : shared secret for image i
For the chain of custody, we want to validate that the
uploader is the person that actually generated the shared
secret. This is done by signing the shared secret using the
private key of the uploader (u):
s0i ¼ SIGNuðsiÞKey ki, used for encrypting image i, and the signed
shared secret s0i are not stored directly. We obfuscate (using
a bitwise exclusive or operation) key ki using signed shared
secret s0i. This breaks the key in two. Next, we encrypt the
obfucated key using the public key of the HANSKEN service
that must be able to access the (unencrypted) data:
4 : bitwise exclusive or operator
PUBu

s0i

: user part of the key
PUBS

ki4s0i

: service part of the key
The keys can be stored in any (publicly available) data-
base: a key store. If a user uwants to access data of image i,
he needs to retrieve encrypted shared secret PUBuðs0iÞ from
the key store, decrypt it using his private key
PVTu

PUBu

s0i
 ¼ s0i
and provide it to service S. This service retrieves the
obfuscated key PUBSðki4s0iÞ from the key store, decrypts it
PVTS

PUBS

ki4s0i
 ¼ ki4s0i
and resolves ki using the provided shared secret:

ki4s0i

4s0i ¼ ki
To grant another person v access to the data of image i,
the uploader u (or any other who has access to the shared
secret) needs to decrypt s0i using his private key
PVTu

PUBu

s0i
 ¼ s0i
and encrypt it using the public key of person v that re-
quires access:
PUBv

s0i
 ¼ PUBv

PVTu

PUBu

s0i

Now, user v can access the data too by retrieving the
encrypted shared secret, decrypt it using his private key
and provide it to the service.
Key exchange
The solution described in the previous section does not
meet the condition that neither the key nor shared secret is
communicated when accessing the service.
The obfuscated encrypted obfuscated key PUBSðki4s0iÞ
can be communicated, since it is encrypted with the public
key of the service. However, signed shared secret s0i needs to
be decrypted by the user wanting to access the data. To
make sure that this shared secret is also encrypted in
transport, a session between a user and the service starts
with negotiating a session key t, based on Difﬁe-Hellman
key exchange (Difﬁe and Hellman, 2006). Basically, both
sides generate a random number: tu for the user and tS for
the service:
tu : random number for user u
tS : random number for service S
These random numbers are encrypted with the public
key of the communicating party (PUBuðtSÞ and PUBSðtuÞ)
and exchanged. The communicating party decrypts the
random number from the other party and combines it with
its own random number, resulting in session key t:
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¼ tu4PVTuðPUBuðtSÞÞ
¼ tS4PVTSðPUBSðtuÞÞ
So without exchanging t, both parties have access to it.
Instead of exchanging shared secret s0i, it is obfuscated
with the session key t and exchanged:
s0i4t
Furthermore, for each session, the service obfuscates the
already obfuscated key ki4s0i with the session key t and
stores it in memory:

ki4s0i

4t
The service uses double-obfuscated key and obfuscated
shared secret to calculate key ki to the data:
ki ¼

ki4s0i

4t

4

s0i4t
Encrypted communication
For all communication, the transport must be encryp-
ted. We follow the principle that within one system, all
transport is encrypted at least once. When it crosses the
border of the system, the data must be protected at least
twice. So to upload an encrypted forensic image, for
example, next to the encryption of the image, the channel
to upload the data must be secured as well.
The module to module communication within the
service takes place via an encrypted remote procedure call
(RPC) framework, where each outgoing and incoming
request is automatically logged to the logging service.
Communication goes beyond RPC however, and amongst
others also includes Hadoop sequence ﬁles2 and tempo-
rary ﬁles generated by tools like Apache Tika3 and
GroupDocs.4Unique identiﬁers for images
When uploading a forensic image, the name of the
image might reveal details of the case, e.g. the name of the
suspect, the name of the case, or the location where ma-
terial was seized. Therefore, all images uploaded to the
central service get a unique randomly generated identiﬁer
that is unrelated to the case. Grouping on the ﬁle system, if
necessary, is done using this identiﬁer and not based on
any information related to the case. We do this because
even with ﬁlenames that show no case related informa-
tion, grouping images together that belong to the same
case may reveal which case the images belong to, e.g. by
correlating image sizes to devices and publicly available
information.2 http://wiki.apache.org/hadoop/SequenceFile.
3 http://tika.apache.org/.
4 http://groupdocs.com/.User management
Authentication and authorization
It seems obvious that authentication and authorization
are crucial to a forensic big data platform. The most basic
authorization in HANSKEN is having access to the encryption
key (section 3.4). This, however, does not include authen-
tication, making it hard to track who did what in the sys-
tem. Also, having access to an encryption key doesn't
necessarily mean that you are authorized to access every
bit of data or perform every function. Some data may be
priviliged communication (e.g. medical information) that
should not be accessible to all investigators.
We do not want to implement a new system where
users are administrated and where users have to choose a
different password from their existing user accounts.
Where possible, we connect to an existing identity man-
ager, e.g. the Active Directory of the organization. This
makes it possible to use different types of authentication
mechanisms, e.g. simple username/password but also
multifactor authentication. Many organizations do not
want to open their identity management system to an
external system. We have chosen to adapt a model where
public keys are exchanged once, and these keys are then
used to verify signed requests and responses between
HANSKEN and the identity manager. The tokens containing
the information about a session, user and its permissions
can be carried through the system to make authorization
decisions, a so-call federated identity (Madsen, Dec. 2005).
As a result, all operations within HANSKEN are performed on
behalf of a user.
For authorization, apart from having access to the key
and shared secret, every function of the system is anno-
tated with a permission. The user needs to have this
permission in his token, before he can execute this func-
tion. This makes it possible to distinguish between different
types of users, e.g. users that can start an extraction pro-
cess, users that can add tags to a trace and users that can
add images to a case.
Secondary identities
Once a user is authenticated, the identity of the user is
stored in a token and can be used for logging. This identity
is not the core identity of the user. Jericho (Forum, May
2011) dictates us to use secondary identities derived from
the core identities. These secondary identities contain
enough information to be able to authenticate and autho-
rize the user, but do not reveal more information than
needed. So correlating and aggregating activities per user
and/or session is possible without the need to know the
core identity. Of course, to retrieve who did what on the
system, you must have access to the core identity of the
user.
Logging framework
Transparency of forensic data means that at any time, it
must be clear where traces extracted from the seized ma-
terial originate from. This keeps the chain of custody in
place. All requests to the central service, including
authentication and authorization requests, data uploads,
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physically separated logging environment, a separate se-
curity domain with its own administrators. Communica-
tion with the logging environment is one way: Messages
are sent from the service to the logging environment, but it
is not possible to send information back from the logging
environment to the service.
Logging results in a full trail of who didwhatwith which
data, making it transparent, e.g. to the investigation team,
to the public prosecutor, to the court or to the suspect's
lawyers. Due to the crucial nature of the logging service, the
central service must not accept requests if logging is not
possible.
Replacement of conﬁdential information
The HANSKEN system will process a lot of private infor-
mation. This information can be traces extracted from
forensic data, e.g. contact information or browser history,
but also information about users logging in into the system,
e.g. user names and other session details. A lot of this in-
formation is stored in logs. There are many different types
of users that want to use the logs for different reasons.
Administrators use them to monitor the system, auditors
use them for auditing, developers can check if any errors
occurred during the extraction process and researchers can
determine what to focus research efforts on. Even though
the log provides this wealth of information, our design
principles put a lot of constraints on the information that
can easily be read in the log.
We designed a system where all log messages are pre-
processed, removing any privacy-sensitive information. It
uses a replacement model that, depending on the scope
and identifying capabilities, replaces identifying (tagged)
information with anonymized (irreversible) or de-
identiﬁed (reversible) values. Re-identifying (reversing)
values can only done by those who are allowed to, i.e. those
who have access to the cryptographic keys needed to
reverse the values. Just like the data, the reversible values
must be stored encrypted and transport of the logmessages
must be secured. With access to the valid encryption keys,
it is still possible to ﬁnd out who actually accessed what
data and provide accountability. With this model, the more
private the information is, the harder it is to reverse this
information.
The replacement model, shown in Table 2, consists of 5
different scopes and 2 types of replacement: reversible and
irreversible. This combines into 10 different possible re-
placements. The different scopes are:
Public No speciﬁc measures need to be taken to protect
this information, since the information is not consideredTable 2
Replacement model for privacy sensitive information.
Scope Reversible (de-identiﬁed) Irreversible (anonymized)
Public P R P I
Environment E R E I
Session S R S I
Message M R M I
None N R N Isensitive. For reversible scope this means that the infor-
mation is stored as is, for irreversible scope a one way
digest is used.
Environment Within a service implementation of the
HANSKEN system, the same information should transform
into the same result. Within a different service imple-
mentation, if the same information is encountered, it
should transform into a different result from the ﬁrst
implementation. Examples of this type of information are
function calls and host names of services. For reversible,
crypto is used with a system wide key. For irreversible, a
one way digest is used with a system identiﬁer as salt.
Session Within a user's session, the same information
should transform into the same result. If during a new
session the same information is encountered, it should
transform into a different result. This makes it possible to
correlate information within a user session, which can for
example help in determining a general work ﬂow, but not
extract who the user was or what he or she did. For
reversible, crypto is used with a system wide key and the
session key as initialization vector (IV). For irreversible, a
digest is used with the session key as salt.
Message In the message scope, it is computationally
infeasible to correlate information outside of the single log
line. The same information within the message can still be
correlated: when a value occurs twice within the message,
it is transformed into the same result. For reversible, a
unique id is generated. This id is stored in the log and the
original value is stored in an external look-up table. Same
values within the message are assigned the same id. For
irreversible, a simple unique number per value is assigned.
None Every single value is considered sensitive and it
should never be possible to correlate the information if you
don't have access to the original material. For reversible a
unique identiﬁer is assigned per value, even if two values
are the same. For irreversible, the value can simply be
removed from the log.
The design principles dictate that None Irreversible is the
default replacement, so when no scope is deﬁned, the value
belonging to this tag is removed from the log. Assigning a
transformation to a tag can be done separately from the
implementation and can be changed according to new in-
sights, legislation or business needs.
As an example the following logline:
[user>harm] performed query [query>key-
word_query] [keyword>elephant] on project
[project>diamond]
Table 3 shows the transformations that are assigned to
the different tags.
Applying these transformations to the logline results in
the following:Table 3
Example transformations.
Tag Transformation
User Environment Reversible (ER)
Query Public Reversible (PR)
Keyword Session Irreversible (SI)
Project Message Reversible (MR)
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y>keyword_query] [keyword>033a8c53] on proj-
ect [project>1]
Tool responsibility
During the extraction process, tools are applied from
forensic libraries (see section 3.1). To be able to determine
the origin of a trace, it must be clear which tools accessed
the data, what traces resulted from applying the tools to the
data and what properties were created by which tools. If a
tool fails during the extraction of a trace, this should also be
stored and queryable.
Business rules
In a multi tenant environment, resources are shared. To
manage resources and prioritize jobs, we set up a dedicated
orchestration service. This service applies rules set by the
business toprioritize jobs. For example, a representativeof the
public prosecutor can deﬁne that the extraction of traces from
images related to child abuse cases take precedence over the
extraction of traces from images related to burglaries. Other
examples of factors that may inﬂuence job prioritization are
theoriginatingorganization, current loadon the system, types
of tools to be applied and manual priority.
Best coding practices
The eight principles are also upheld by embracing
development standards, e.g. Scrum-framework,5 code re-
views and extensive testing via unit tests, integration tests
and regression tests.
Open standards
We use open standards where possible. These standards
include cryptographic algorithms, message transport pro-
tocols, ﬁle storage formats, job distribution, cluster man-
agement, etc. By using open standards, we make sure we
are not locked in to a speciﬁc vendor and have the ability to
replace parts of the implementation. Furthermore, using
open standard makes it possible to use software that im-
plements these standards and is maintained by vendors or
communities.
Separation of concerns
Apart from using open standards, we apply the design
principle separation of concerns. This means that the
implementation is split into multiple modules that all
implement correlated functionality. Each module provides
an interface that can be used by other modules (compara-
ble to the façade design pattern), making it possible to
better use, integrate and test modules and easily replace
module implementations.
Single point for external access
External access to the service is provided via a separate
module as well. This module provides a RESTful API5 https://www.scrum.org/.(Fielding, 2000), such that clients can communicate with it.
This interface serves as a base for separately developed
graphical user interfaces and scripts. This module is based
on XIRAF's query language that is currently in use.
No single point of failure
The service should not contain a single point of failure
(SPOF). This means that the system should not depend on
one single machine: if a single machine fails, the system
must continue servicing its full functionality. Therefore, we
use distributed technologies. Many implementations exist
for the requirements we want to implement: distributed
storage, distributed processing of data and a distributed
search engine.
Implementation
Keeping in mind the motivation and design consider-
ations from the previous two sections, we have imple-
mented a system. The data in this system is protected,
privacy measures with respect to the data and its users are
taken into account and it is transparent who did what with
the data. Designing a service also involves hardware,
network conﬁguration and software. In this section we
discuss the impact of the principles to the software solution
and system design itself.
At a high level, the system consists of multiple cooper-
ating independent modules that all implement correlated
functionality. This section describes the different modules,
the implementation of these modules and the communica-
tion between the modules. Where applicable, the consider-
ations described in Section 3 are mentioned. Since not every
consideration relates to a single module but can span mul-
tiple modules, they are mentioned where most applicable.
Although a lot of functionality is already implemented
in HANSKEN, not every module is completed. Missing func-
tionality is described as we foresee it.Modules
Fig. 2 shows an overview of the modules the HANSKEN
system consists of, including their intermediate commu-
nication and the basic technologies they are implemented
on. In the HANSKEN system, we call the modules services:
they all serve speciﬁc functionality.
RPC framework
One of the most fundamental components of HANSKEN is
the RPC Framework. This framework is the basis of
communication between the different modules and con-
tains a lot of the shared functionality of these modules.
Fig. 3 shows the RPC stack. The ﬁrst responsibility of the
framework is setting up communication, including a fail-
over mechanism (consideration 12). This mechanism is
implemented in two different ways: static failover, where
failover hosts are preconﬁgured, and dynamic failover,
where failover hosts are registered in Zookeeper.66 http://zookeeper.apache.org/.
Fig. 2. Module overview.
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everything that is communicated (consideration 8). If a
module sets up communication with another module and
sends a message, this results in at least six log messages:
two log messages for setting up communication (one at
eachmodule), two logmessages for the sending the request
message and two log messages for the response message.
Another responsibility of the RPC framework is distrib-
uting information that is required in pretty much every
module. This includes distributing credentials. For
authentication and authorization (consideration 7) we use
the SAML 2.0 standard.7
Since Jericho dictates that every module should protect
itself, authorization must take place at the module. The
authorization mechanism is implemented in the RPC
framework as well, which eliminates the need for a sepa-
rate authorization service. Each public function on a service
is annotated with required permissions, possibly with a
identiﬁer for a speciﬁc object, e.g. a project (case) or an
image. The provided credentials must contain the right
permissions in order to execute the function.
The current implementation of the RPC Framework uses
the Netty Framework8 to send the bytes across the wire.
Gatekeeper Service
The Gatekeeper service is the module that communicates
with theoutsideworld. Theﬁrst responsibility of thismodule
is related to authentication (consideration 7). As mentioned
in Section 4.1.1, we use the SAML 2.0 standard for authenti-
cation and authorization. The Gatekeeper acts as a Service
Provider (SP). When a user is not yet authenticated when
accessing HANSKEN, the Gatekeeper service redirects the user7 https://www.oasis-open.org/standards#samlv2.0.
8 http://netty.io/.to an identity provider (IdP), which is responsible for
authenticating the user. The identity provider is not part of
HANSKEN. Any identity provider that is able to provide SAML-
tokens sufﬁces, e.g. Active Directory. By outsourcing
authentication, organization can choose their own type of
authentication mechanisms. Furthermore, it opens up the
possibility for single sign-on. The Gatekeeper puts the user
credentials in theRPC-request tobeused throughoutHANSKEN.
The Gatekeeper provides a RESTful web service
(Fielding, 2000) (consideration 12). All functionality
implemented in HANSKEN must be available through this
interface, like searching, creating projects and starting the
extraction process. The module translates these requests to
RPC-requests and communicates them to the Lobby
Service.
Lobby Service
The Lobby Service redirects user calls to the appropriate
modules. It is aware of the different routes that function
calls should follow and makes these calls in appropriate
order. Search queries for example are typically performed
on projects (a collection of images). It is the responsibility
of the Lobby Service to ﬁrst retrieve the list of images from
the Project Service and send the query on these images to
the Trace Service.
Orchestration service
The Orchestration Service is responsible for making
business decisions based on a set of rules (consideration
11). These business rules are deﬁned and maintained
outside the module and determines priority for different
functions based on these rules. Although this module is not
implemented yet, we have done some experiments with
Drools9 and the results are promising.
Project Service
The Project Service is responsible for storing information
related to images and cases (which we call projects). Im-
ages are storedwith a de-identiﬁed name on the ﬁle system
(consideration 6). The unique identiﬁers need to be trans-
formed into names that make sense to human in-
vestigators. A case normally consists of multiple images.
This module administers which images are combined into
cases. So, the Project Service administers images and pro-
jects, including details about these objects, like the name of
the person and locationwhere a devicewas conﬁscated, the
name of a case and the name of the investigator that
created an image.
The Project Service is implemented on top of a simple
key-value store. Current implementations offer both seri-
alization to disk using Kryo10 and storing the image and
project details in a Cassandra store.11
Data service
The Data Service is responsible for retrieving data from
images (consideration 3). The current implementation uses9 http://www.drools.org/.
10 https://github.com/EsotericSoftware/kryo.
11 http://cassandra.apache.org/.
Fig. 3. RPC framework.
12 http://wiki.fasterxml.com/SmileFormat.
13 http://wiki.apache.org/hadoop/HDFS.
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Data Service as a standalone service like any other module
in HANSKEN, on the other hand it is possible to embed the
Data Service in another module. This is done for perfor-
mance reasons. For relatively infrequent calls, like showing
a picture in a GUI, it is feasible to read data using an RPC-
call. This includes all the beneﬁts as described in Section
4.1.1. For the extraction of traces from an image, however,
the number of reads and the amount of data to be read is
currently too large to retrieve via our current RPC imple-
mentation. The downside of including the Data Service as a
module is that we don't get the beneﬁts of the RPC-
framework like logging of all the calls. It also contradicts
the Jericho principles that every service should protect it-
self: the Data Service has to trust the Extraction Service (see
Section 4.1.8) with the key of the data in order to provide
the data. When external parties add tools to the Extraction
Service, these tools have to be trusted with the key to the
data as well.
For now, to trust these parties with the key to the data,
we prefer making the tools an integral part of HANSKEN,
including a code review to check for potential data leaks
(consideration 12).
In the future we want to be able to only run the Data
Service as a service, where the Extraction Service can
communicate using channels that have less overhead than
RPC on TCP/IP but still allows for the same beneﬁts, e.g. RPC
on Unix sockets.
To read data from an image, the Data Service requires a
number of parameters. Other than the offset, the size and
the key, the service requires a transformation path to be
able to read the data as it was originally read. This means
that to retrieve the contents of an attachment in a PST-mailbox, the Data Service needs to know the location of
the PST-ﬁle on disk, the type of PST-encryption used (none,
Permutation or Cyclic (Microsoft Corporation, 2014)) and
where the attachment resides in the PST-ﬁle. These trans-
formations are generated during the extraction and stored
with the traces in the Trace Service in a serialized format
(currently using JSON Smile,12 but other serializations are
possible). When retrieving the data of a trace, this trans-
formation is provided to the Data Service and used to
retrieve the original data. This makes it possible to prevent
data being copied out to temporary ﬁles when retrieving or
processing it (consideration 5).
For performance, scalability and high availability we use
a distributed ﬁle system for storing the data. We have
chosen the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS)13
(Shvachko et al., 2010), due to its natural connection to
MapReduce (Dean and Ghemawat, 2008). Apart from that,
we implemented a version that runs on top of a local ﬁle
system.
Keystore Service
The Keystore Service is responsible for storing the
encrypted obfuscated keys and encrypted shared secrets
(consideration 4):
PUBuðs0 iÞ : user part of the key
PUBSðki4s0 iÞ : service part of the key
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is the Data Service (Section 4.1.6). As shown in Fig. 2, the
Keystore Service is preferably not deployed within the
HANSKEN service, but in a separate security domain. This
means that with each call to retrieve or process data, the
user has to provide both keys before the Data Service can
actually read data from the image. Consequently, users only
have access to images that they have been explicitly gran-
ted access to.
Current implementation of the Keystore Service pro-
vides an RPC-interface to add, retrieve and delete keys and
has options to store the keys in memory or a Lucene
index.14
Extraction Service
The responsibility of the Extraction Service is to analyze
the data and extract traces from it. It applies tools from
forensic libraries (consideration 1) to the data and sends
the resulting trace information to the Trace Service (section
4.1.9). The tools range from parsing ﬁle systems and ﬁles to
carving unallocated space and extracting keywords.
In the proof of concept we implemented in 2012, we
based the forensic extraction process on the Hadoop
implementation15 of MapReduce (Dean and Ghemawat,
2008). MapReduce is a framework for distributed process-
ing of data (consideration 2). Although using MapReduce
drastically speeds up the extraction process (from 24 h per
terabyte in XIRAF to over 3 terabytes per hour in our proof of
concept implementation), MapReduce is a batch-based
process. To extract all traces from a forensic image, we
still need about three to ﬁve iterations. This is caused by the
fact that in our current implementation the ﬁle system
traversal cannot be parallelized. The MapReduce process
for parallel processing of all ﬁles in a ﬁle system can only
start once the ﬁle system traversal is ﬁnished. We are
currently doing research on processing extracted traces as
soon as they become available from any tool. For this, we
plan to use a streaming extraction like Storm16 on top of a
Kafka queue.17
In the MapReduce implementation (and the planned
Storm implementation), the traces are available for
querying soon after they are extracted from the forensic
image. No additional publication is needed for this.
Although not all data is available, this gives investigation
teams the opportunity to have access to traces early in the
investigation. This is especially true when this functionality
is combined with the dynamic pipelining of the extraction
process and the imaging process, as explained in Section
3.2.
The order in which tools are currently applied is itera-
tive, based on a statically ordered list. We use the rationale
behind smoothsort (Dijkstra, 1982) to make sure that the
tools are applied in the correct order in only a few itera-
tions. This means for example that in the static list of tools
one of the ﬁrst tools to be applied is the tool to determine14 http://lucene.apache.org/.
15 http://wiki.apache.org/hadoop/MapReduce.
16 http://storm-project.net/.
17 http://kafka.apache.org/.the mimetype. This is because a lot of sequential tools use
this information to determine if they can run on this object.
Another example is that the tool to calculate hashes has to
run before the tool to check if a hash is present in a hash
database. Since no image is the same and the optimal order
of tools is different for each image, we are currently satis-
ﬁed with this solution. In the future we want to automat-
ically determine an even more optimal ordering for the
tools instead of the current best effort, but the expected
time it takes to build this mechanism versus the gain in
extraction speed does not (yet) justify the resource use.
We do not yet support the ability to run additional,
custom, tools. It is possible for external parties to create
tools and add them to the Extraction Service. These tools
however need to be part of the Extraction Service during
the extraction process in order to be applied. Currently, it is
not possible for an investigator to run a customMapReduce
job where he uses picture analysis to search all pictures for
a speciﬁc object, for example. In the future, a user should be
able to run a customized job and store the results in the
Trace Service. This functionality is referred to as asyn-
chronous queries.
Trace Service
The Trace Service is responsible for storing and
retrieving traces. Traces consist of metadata, a full keyword
index and (a link to) the actual data of the trace. For real
time querying, a distributed search engine ﬁts better than a
distributed data store like a key-value store or document
store (Ugen, April 2013). For this, we use ElasticSearch.18
Preparing for asynchronous queries, we also store the
traces in HBase.19
Every trace stored in the Trace Service has one or more
types. The properties of the trace are determined by a set of
base properties, e.g. a unique identiﬁer, type and name,
combined with additional properties for the types of a
trace, e.g. modiﬁcation date, e-mail subject or phone
number. Additionally, for each trace we store information
about the tools that were applied to the trace (consider-
ation 10). Therefore, with all properties of all traces we
store the tool that extracted it, both its unique name and
version, and if the tool was applied successfully. We also
store the time the trace was published by the system. This
information can be used to search the logs for any addi-
tional information about the trace.
Traces can have data associated with it. As described in
Section 4.1.6, a transformation path is stored with these
traces. A trace can have multiple data streams: a mail
message stored in a PST-mailbox can be stored in different
formats (Microsoft Corporation, 2014): preview, plain text,
RTF compressed and HTML. Messages generally have more
than one stream and need to be stored accordingly. The
same is true for Word documents: we store both the raw
stream, the bytes as they are stored on disk, but also the
text stream, without the additional metadata. By storing
these different data streams, we determine the different
data properties (hashes, entropy, mimetype) and allow for18 http://www.elasticsearch.org/.
19 http://hbase.apache.org/.
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a Word document to the plain text stream of a PST e-mail
message. Fig. 4 shows an example of a trace.
Traces can be queried in a number of ways. All the query
options described in Bhoedjang et al. (2012) are available,Fig. 4. Trace eincluding searching for keywords, querying property
values and creating (super) time lines. Moreover, Elas-
ticSearch implements aggregations, meaning that together
with a query result, statistics on the results are provided.
This functionality gives a boost to the graphical userxample.
Fig. 5. Logging service.
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and thus in identifying signiﬁcant seized material.
Logging service
When HANSKEN is running, a lot of log messages are
generated (consideration 8). Examples are log messages
generated by user activity, the extraction process and
communication, but also includes log messages generated
by the operating system and the forensic libraries. Rough
estimates suggest that the number of log messages gener-
ated in The Netherlands will be in the range of 100,000 per
second. This is a number not uncommon in a lot of big data
systems and software is available to handle these numbers.
We have chosen to adapt a Kafka/Storm-cluster for our
Logging Service. Fig. 5 shows the different parts of this
service.
Logging starts by capturing the log messages using a
logger. We use SLF4J20 for the API. Most applications log
their messages using Log4J.21 The appender is responsible
for encoding and encrypting the log message. Our current
implementation uses a ﬁxed hard coded encryption key for
the logging framework. Since this key can be compromised,
we want to migrate to a more secure solution, like FI-BAF
(Yavuz et al., 2012a) or LOG-FAS (Yavuz et al., 2012b).
After the message is encoded and encrypted, it is put on
a Kafka-queue. Kafka is very robust and can handle a large
number of messages. They are persisted to disk and can be
archived if needed. Since the messages are encrypted, this
does not impact security. A Kafka spout22 retrieves the
messages from the queue and sends them to the ﬁrst bolt in
the Storm cluster. This bolt decrypts the message and sends
in to the decoder bolt. The next bolt anonymizes the mes-
sage where applicable (consideration 9). The information
that needs to be stored in the external look-up table is send
to the CassandraStorageBolt, which stores it in a Cassandra20 http://www.slf4j.org/.
21 http://logging.apache.org/log4j/.
22 https://github.com/HolmesNL/kafka-spout.store. The anonymized log messages are sent to a bolt that
stores them in an ElasticSearch cluster.
Additional bolts can be added where needed, e.g. to
validate log messages, to send alerts to administrators or
developers if a certain log message passes through or to
combine log messages to a higher level message.
Service implementation
Themodules have to run on hardware and software that
impact the chosen solutions as well. Apart from trusting
users, (system) software needs to be trusted as well. A
server (host) that is added to the environment has to
authenticate itself. It must be enforced that the server is
trusted and allowed to store forensic images, store logging
information or take part in the distributed data search
engine.
For implementing trust relations between hosts and
services we use basic Kerberos (Neuman and Ts'o, 1994). To
assure that a host is allowed to join a service, the host needs
to provide a ticket. This ticket is provided by the Authen-
tication Server which is part of the Key Distribution Center.
Apart from the examples above, the principles have
more impact on deployment. Examples are server virtual-
ization, encryption of temporary ﬁles like MapReduce
sequence ﬁles and encryption of stored databases. All this
has been addressed in our current conﬁguration. However,
discussing the deployment of HANSKEN in detail goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
User interface
Since HANSKEN is designed as a service with an open
interface, an organization can design and implement its
own user interface according to its own needs. We have
implemented a number of interfaces according to our
needs and based on we have learned from our users over
the number of years we run XIRAF. The user interfaces are not
the subject of this paper, but for completeness we brieﬂy
show the implemented functionality.
Graphical user interfaces
We have developed two graphical user interfaces: A
tactical user interface, aimed at detectives (van Baar et al.,
2014), and a technical interface, aimed at digital in-
vestigators. Both interfaces provide the same functionality,
however the tactical interface is more explicit in the
possible queries that can be performed and shows less
technical details, e.g. it misses a hex view.
The tactical interface is implemented on top of XIRAF and
is compatible with HANSKEN. The technical interface is newly
designed, since the interface shown in Bhoedjang et al.
(2012) is not compatible with HANSKEN. Fig. 6 shows the
basic search page where the user searched for e-mails
containing the term peter.
The technical user interface is currently being designed
and implemented. The main difference with the tactical
user interface is that the technical interface gives direct
access to all features of the query language, presentation of
the results is conﬁgurable (based on a sortable table where
the user can select and order columns) and more in-depth
Fig. 6. Tactical user interface.
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shows a preview of the technical user interface.
Programmatic user interfaces
Next to graphical user interfaces we also provide bind-
ings that can be used to connect to HANSKEN using a pro-
gramming language. We have currently implemented
bindings in Python, making it possible to write scripts in
Python or connect using an interactive shell and query the
database.
Related work
Quick and Choo (Quick and Choo, 2014) present an
overview of the impacts of increasing volume of digital
forensic data. The summarize the published research andfuture research challenges with respect to this topic. They
state that there is a need for real world applicability of
methods to address the digital forensic data volume
challenge.
A way to cope with the new big data challenges is to
perform triage, a term borrowed from emergency response
in which patients are prioritized according to their likeli-
hood of survival. With triage it is possible to make an
educated guess on whether or not seized material contains
relevant traces. This makes it possible to quickly reduce the
big amount of material and decrease the processing time. A
lot of work is done in the ﬁeld of triage, e.g. by Roussev et al.
(Roussev et al., 2013) and Garﬁnkel (Garﬁnkel, 2013). Triage
is a valuable approach which we plan to use for ordering
the processing of images, not for leaving images
unprocessed.
Fig. 7. Preview of the technical user interface.
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under development or in production. These systems are
generally built to automate and speed-up the extraction of
traces from forensic images, which is a good starting point
to set up Digital Forensics as a Service (DFaaS). In 2004,
Roussev et al. (Roussev and Richard, 2004) described a
distributed processing system many times faster than
FTK.23 This was a lab setup. Since then FTK 3 and higher
support a total of four so-called workers to automatically
process data in parallel. Research on the automated pro-
cessing of seized material was coined in 2006 by Alink et al.
(2006). Ayers (2009) put down the need for such a system
and described the requirements that such a system must,
should or may meet. In 2012, Bhoedjang et al. (2012)
explained how the XIRAF system is engineered and in use
in the Netherlands. One of the efforts to build a DFaaS
system is proposed by Lee and Un (Lee and Un, 2012). They
focused on speed and provided the end-user with a web
interface to search through the data. Cohen et al. (Cohen
et al., 2011) present the Google Rapid Response (GRR)
framework, a platform for enterprise forensic in-
vestigations enabling remote raw disk and memory access.
Via this framework, multiple remote machines can be ac-
quired and analyzed concurrently. Where our focus lies in
extraction traces from seized (off line) devices, they focus
on (on line) corporate settings. Wen et al. (Wen et al., 2013)
introduce a service-based framework for supporting com-
puter forensics work ﬂow, based on GRR. They designed a23 http://www.accessdata.com/products/digital-forensics/ftk.cloud-based framework for dealing with large volume of
forensic data, sharing inter-operable forensic software, and
providing tools for investigators to create and customize
data processing work ﬂow. They propose a “forensic app
store” where work ﬂow can be constructed using software
components (“apps”). Forensic examiners and investigators
can on-demand create, invoke, and deploy tasks based on
the functionality available in the software components.
Recently, Cruz et al. (Cruz et al., 2015) propose a new
distributed data store for remote forensics that partitions
data into database ﬁles that can be accessed independently
so that distributed forensic analysis can be done.
In 2002, Carrier (Carrier, October 2002) set out that legal
arguments must be taken into account when developing
forensic tools. He concluded that open source tools may
more clearly and comprehensively meet the guidelines
than closed source tools do. In our opinion, the code does
not need to be open as long as the tests are clear and others
than the developers have the possibility to run their tests
against (parts of) the code. From that perspective, trans-
parency is more important than providing the code itself.
A lot of work is done in the ﬁeld of encrypting data. Song
et al. (Song et al., 2000), for example, present a technique
for searches on encrypted data. Their solutions support
searching data that is not known to the organization that
stores the data. The solution they provide focuses on exact
text searches, which is too narrow for the solution we
propose.
Bayuk (Bayuk, 2011) recommends a systems-level
approach to security validation of a cloud service.
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December 2011) have written a comprehensive set of
guidelines for the outsourcing of data, applications and
infrastructure to a public cloud environment, while
acknowledging that the entire cloud ecosystem is in rapid
development. Their primary recommendation is: “Carefully
plan the security and privacy aspects of cloud computing
solutions before engaging them”, which corresponds to the
call by the Canadian Information and Privacy Commis-
sioner (Ann Cavoukian, January 2013) to integrate good
privacy and security measures into information systems
early on.
Aminnezhad et al. (Aminnezhad et al., 2012) give an
extensive overview of how privacy is and can be handled in
digital forensics. They conclude that privacy measures
should be part of the design and not added as counter-
measures in a later stage. Apart from that, they note that
there should be more focus on education and awareness of
preserving privacy in the professional forensic ﬁeld.
Law et al. (Law et al., 2011) state that to protect privacy,
personal data that are not related to the investigation
subject should be excluded during computer forensic ex-
amination. They propose a procedure for handling private
digital data, based on an encryption key that is kept by the
owner.
Shebaro (2012) describes how forensic tools can be
developed that preserve the privacy of the persons in
network data, while at the same time enabling law
enforcement to perform an investigation.
Tan et al. (Tan et al., 2013) review solutions that address
system security and data provenance in distributed sys-
tems. They argue that forensics of a cloud solution is only
possible if that data is trustworthy, for which data prove-
nance is a necessity.
Conclusions
In this paper, we motivate why a centralized service for
large scale forensic data analysis is a good idea from a
business perspective. The forensic drivers for this are (1)
minimization of case lead time, meaning that the data
should be available to investigation teams as soon as
possible, (2) maximization of the coverage, meaning that
we want to understand as much from the seized digital
material as possible, and (3) specialize people, meaning
that dedicated people have specialized tasks for which they
are educated and equipped.
Centralization of forensic data analysis and the associ-
ated risks, mandate keeping track of several design prin-
ciples; we identiﬁed eight. The three most important
principles are sociologically driven and go hand-in-hand:
security, privacy and transparency. We set out these prin-
ciples from the viewpoint of the seized material, the people
involved with processing the data, and system design itself.
The other ﬁve principles are mainly business driven: multi
tenancy, future proof, data retention, reliability and high
availability.
From the drivers and principles, we extracted a total of
twelve topics that are most important for the design of the
HANSKEN system: reuse of forensic knowledge, distribution
of the extraction of traces from forensic images (bring thetools to the data and let the data drive the analysis and
extraction), the image format used to store the data, key
management (creation, storage and exchange), encryption
of all communication, the use of unique identiﬁers for the
forensic images, user management (authentication and
authorization and the use of secondary identities), the
logging framework, de-identiﬁcation or anonimization of
conﬁdential information in the logs, responsibility and
traceability of the tools that analyze the data and extract
traces, business rules for orchestrating the system and
ﬁnally our coding practices (use of open standards, sepa-
ration of concerns, access via a REST interface and no single
point of failure).
In this paper we brieﬂy addressed these topics and
explained how they impact the design and implementation
of the HANSKEN system. The system consist of several mod-
ules that all serve a speciﬁc goal: the Gatekeeper Service as
central entrance point, handling authentication, the Lobby
Service as central unit for routing all incoming requests, the
Orchestration Service for business decisions, the Project
Service for storing data related to images and cases, the
Data Service for providing access to the data, the Keystore
Service for storing keys, the Extraction Service for applying
forensic tools to the data to extract traces, the Trace Service
for storing and querying the extracted traces and ﬁnally the
Logging Service for handling and storing all logs generated
by the other services. We explained how all these modules
intercommunicate using RPC and what (distributed) tech-
nologies they are based on.
Although the HANSKEN system is still under development,
the ﬁrst cases are run with it. We plan to replace XIRAF by
HANSKEN before the end of this year.References
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